An open directory was found on a server at 104.233.217[.]108, serving its contents over port 8888. The listing ran to 64,006 files. Among them sat the source code, PHP and Python backends, admin modules, delivery routers and operator notes for two iOS exploit kits that public reporting had named only days earlier: Coruna and DarkSword. None of it had been cleaned up.

At first glance this looked like the campaign's live infrastructure. Reading the files says otherwise. The addresses public reporting tied to the attack, the injector domains, the random .icu routers, the telemetry channel codes, do not appear anywhere in this directory. What is here is the workbench: the kit being parsed, cloned, rebuilt and offered as a service, with its own set of panel addresses that the public indicators never mentioned.

At a glance

  • The open directory on 104.233.217[.]108 sits in AS54600, PEG TECH INC, United States, on port 8888, first seen by Etugen around September 24, 2026 and last seen around November 2, 2026. Etugen Trashpile classified the listing across 22 categories, from credential-access and exposed-secrets to c2, loader, miner, webshell and active-directory.
  • The directory holds the backend of both kits: CorunaParse.php, DarkSword.php, darksword_router.py, and a Python management layer bannered as iOS V2 管理系统.
  • The most significant finding is panel infrastructure absent from the incident's public indicators: we.xpjkk[.]xyz resolving to 43.247.132[.]175, and i.131422[.]com named in the router as the source the attack chain was captured from.
  • The collection modules target crypto wallet seed phrases, user notes and photo albums, wrapping the albums into 7z archives protected by a MASTER_KEY password.
  • The incident's payload, collected by Etugen from 136.113.106[.]136 on November 17, shares two kit-specific artifacts with this workbench: the attribute data-chain-url and the stage directory weifile. The iOS stage of the incident was built with this kit family.
  • The injection-side indicators from public reporting, 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, the .icu routers, the channel code 02111110, BIGNIAO and /api/iptj, do not appear in the directory's content. The string JIUJIU888 matched ten files, but only as an account name in records about an unrelated fraud operation, not as the loader path.
  • Stealer log records hold eight credential records for chat.webshell[.]lol and xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol, the oldest dated April 13, 2026. The injector domain was in use five months before its first reported appearance.
  • Dated backups place edits on October 9, 2026, and an operator pentest report inside the directory is dated September 21, 2026, pointing at a workbench that has been maintained for weeks.

Background

A public report published on November 16, 2026 described a supply-chain incident in which malicious JavaScript was served through a web experimentation platform to visitors of 178 organizations. On iPhones and iPads the payload loaded two iOS exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword, through hidden iframes. That reporting listed the injection domains, several random .icu routers acting as iOS delivery hosts, telemetry endpoints and track.js build hashes. This hunt started from one host that Etugen surfaced when a content search matched hundreds of files naming those two kits, and set out to answer a single question: whose workbench is this, and does it connect to the injection side.

The earlier injector, webshell[.]lol

The payload host was not where this actor started. Public reporting places an injector domain, webshell[.]lol, on third-party sites from September 17, 2026, delivered through an SEO backlink panel script, and then inside the scripts of three other third-party providers between November 13 and 16. When the first injection through the experimentation platform was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16, the snippet loaded webshell[.]lol/get.js. By 08:28 UTC the snippets pointed at 1688360[.]cc/track.js instead. Public reporting calls the two the same actor's work; the one concrete overlap it shows is that first snippet loading the older injector.

The injector is no longer serving anything. Public reporting records that the domain was placed on registry hold at 03:37 UTC on November 17, the day after the incident. The link from the injector to the payload host is therefore stated as reported, not as observed.

What stealer logs say about the domain

The domain has a longer history than the September date suggests. Stealer log records reviewed during this hunt hold eight credential records for two subdomains of webshell[.]lol, six on chat.webshell[.]lol and two on xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol. They were saved in browsers on machines that were later infected with stealer malware. The oldest is dated April 13, 2026, five months before the injector was first reported.

Stealer log records for subdomains of webshell[.]lol
Figure 1: Stealer log records for two subdomains of webshell[.]lol
Host Path Account, masked Note
chat.webshell[.]lol /guest OTH•••••212 Oldest record for the domain
chat.webshell[.]lol / das•••••312 Same password as the account above
chat.webshell[.]lol /guest OTH•••••212 Second capture of the same account
chat.webshell[.]lol /guest hap••••23 Password reused on two unrelated sites
xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol / Xia••••• Account name matches the subdomain label

The records are enough to say three things. The domain was in use by April 2026 and carried a chat service with a guest login at chat.webshell[.]lol, so it wasn't registered for the November campaign. A second subdomain, xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol, takes its name from the account recorded on it, which reads as a personal space handed to a named user. And the distinct logins come down to four account names and three passwords: two of the names share one password and are most likely one person.

Following the passwords

Investigating with the passwords themselves brings out more. The password shared by the two April accounts returns records on more than a dozen other sites between May and October 2026.

Stealer log results for the password shared by two chat.webshell[.]lol accounts
Figure 2: Other sites where the password shared by two chat.webshell[.]lol accounts appears

Two of those sites are DDoS-for-hire services, lkxstress[.]su and neostress[.]cc, and a third is a USDT-themed site, hbc-usdt[.]com. The rest are everyday accounts: a chat platform, a streaming service, a game publisher's login, adult chat sites and a Moroccan school portal. This is the footprint of one individual, and one who registers on stresser services, not that of a shared service account.

The password of the June account tells a different story. It returns seven matching records across three hosts.

Stealer log results for the password of the June chat.webshell[.]lol account
Figure 3: Other sites where the password of the June chat.webshell[.]lol account appears

The same account name and password appear on the member login of an expired-domain research tool, a product used in SEO and link-building work, on May 8, 2026. The same password under a different account name appears on an Indonesian gaming portal, on April 30 and May 3. An SEO tool account that shares a password with a chat.webshell[.]lol login is consistent with the SEO backlink panel that public reporting names as the injector's first carrier.

It isn't proof of more than that. These records describe people who logged in to the service from infected machines. Nothing in them shows that any of these accounts operated the injector, and the records carry no stealer family name. The accounts are carried as leads at low confidence, and passwords are withheld here.

Discovery

The seed was 104.233.217[.]108. Etugen tracks it only as an open directory, not as a classified threat host, and a full host-context lookup returned no related hosts through JARM, certificate, malware or ASN pivots. The listing itself is what carried the investigation. The Trashpile record assigns 22 categories and a tag set that includes certipy, amass, mysqldump, ngrok, telegram, Webshell, Miner, Exposed:Credentials, .git/ and the label cve-2025-63888. That CVE tag reflects content Etugen matched in the directory; its relationship to the Coruna and DarkSword chain is not established and is left as an open question.

Address Role Open port Service Verification
104.233.217[.]108 Open directory, kit workbench 8888/tcp HTTP open directory Etugen Trashpile
43.247.132[.]175 DarkSword admin panel for we.xpjkk[.]xyz n/a n/a Inferred from file contents
i.131422[.]com Traffic-capture source for the attack-chain router n/a n/a Inferred from file contents

No independent port scan was run beyond the exposed 8888 listener. The two addresses in the lower rows were not scanned; they are read from the operator documents and the router header in the directory, so their role is inferred, not confirmed by a direct probe.

Inside the directory: a kit, parsed and rebuilt

The directory is not a single clean project. The same scripts appear in several copies of a backend tree, which reads as multiple snapshots of the same workspace left on disk. Two code families run through it. One is a PHP port of the kit, the other a Python management layer. A third set is operator documents and backups.

The PHP port carries the channel logic. CorunaParse.php is 28,451 B, Etugen file id f146399d. Its header describes the Coruna channel fields /a /u /event /ub /uj /us and notes that it is kept in sync with an admin-tree copy at admin/app/service/CorunaParse.php. It defines a WALLET_LETTERS map that ties a single channel letter to a wallet brand, for example a to MetaMask. DarkSword.php is 15,569 B, file id b7784dec, and describes the DarkSword next-chain HTTP API with /api/ds/* endpoints named beacon, result and war. These two files are the clearest fingerprint of the kit's server side.

The delivery router is Python. darksword_router.py runs to 76,465 B and maps the chain onto three route shapes: GET /go/{code}, /pe/{filename} for DarkSword JavaScript and /gooll/{filename} for Coruna JavaScript. Its header is where the workbench's provenance leaks.

DarkSword 攻击链路由, iOS 18 only, 来自 i.131422[.]com 抓包

In English: "DarkSword attack-chain router, iOS 18 only, captured from i.131422[.]com." The word 抓包 is traffic capture. The router was not written from scratch; it was reconstructed from traffic captured against a deployment reachable at i.131422[.]com. That is the first piece of new infrastructure the public indicators never listed.

The Python management layer

The backend scripts sit under a backend/scripts tree and share a banner.

作者: iOS V2 管理系统

In English: "author: iOS V2 management system." The same string runs across maintenance scripts with telling names: recover_coruna_albums.py, repair_coruna_notes_sanitize.py, audit_ios_coruna_failures.py, demote_ios18_coruna_misroute.py, coruna_sweeper.py, brute_coruna_ts.py, merge_coruna_config_by_ip.py and demote_darksword_without_evidence.py. These are not exploit code. They are the housekeeping of a running panel: recover albums, sanitize notes, audit failures, demote misrouted iOS 18 victims, merge per-IP config. A kit that only served payloads would not need them. A back-office that collects and curates victim data would.

The application modules carry a different header, a service advertisement.

搭建 二开 网站维护 Telegram @

In English: "setup, secondary development, site maintenance," followed by a Telegram handle that is blank in the recovered snippet. The same operator who rebuilt the router also markets the result. Among those modules, coruna_user_set.py handles POST /api/user/set and parses wallet mnemonic phrases while tagging the wallet source. lab_coruna_channel.py numbers channels through a ?c= parameter, separating a main channel from agent channels. coruna_notes_store.py stores notes through POST /api/user/avatar/pic. coruna_chain_progress.py tracks attack-chain progress steps. coruna_bin.py is the collection packager: it wraps a Coruna album into a 7z archive encrypted with a MASTER_KEY password and a plaintext timestamp. Read together, the modules describe a collection pipeline aimed at crypto wallet material, personal notes and photo albums.

The operator documents

Six documents stand out from the code. XPJKK-DARKSWORD-FULL-REPORT.md is 53,174 B, file id 9d7378ce, a Chinese-language report whose subject is a penetration test of a DarkSword admin panel. It names the target as we.xpjkk[.]xyz, records its resolution to 43.247.132[.]175, and labels the panel JackApple 漏洞管理后台 v9.0 with an internal code name of DarkSword Admin. In English the panel label reads "JackApple vulnerability management backend v9.0." The document is dated September 21, 2026.

That report reframes the whole directory. The owner was not simply running the kit. The owner broke into, or at least studied in depth, a DarkSword admin panel operated under the handle JackApple, then captured the attack chain from a second deployment at i.131422[.]com and rebuilt it under a new brand, iOS V2 管理系统. The evidence leans toward a third party cloning and reselling the kit rather than the original injection operator, though whether the two overlap is not fully resolved.

The other documents support the picture. darksword-coruna-c2.md, 1,376 B, file id 16d679ca, first seen September 30, 2026, holds C2 notes. coruna_c2_findings.json, file id e2255e4a, and coruna_victim_report.json, file id e49c9b8d, are a findings file and a victim report. darksword_passwords.txt, 684 B, file id 11d93d54, is a password list. darksword.db, 176,128 B, file id 6869b2ca, is a SQLite database. The victim report and the database are the right place to size the collected data; they are left for an analyst to read under masking, since counts matter and names do not.

Dated backups fix the editing in time. Three resource-fork files, ._gooll.html.bak_corunafb_20261009_031714, ._rce_loader.js.bak_corunafb_20261009_031714 and ._gooll.html.bak_coruna_fix_20261009, all carry an October 9, 2026 stamp, with one down to 03:17:14. A fork named ._DarkSword-RCE_副本, where 副本 means "copy," together with the macOS AppleDouble forks across the tree, shows the project was copied from a Mac.

The injection side is not here

The hunt's most useful negative result is clean. The addresses, codes and endpoints that public reporting tied to the live attack were searched directly in the directory's content. None of them appear.

The searches covered the payload domain 1688360, the injector webshell.lol, the reported domain linkforge, the fallback C2 ios-hack, the channel code 02111110, the telemetry code BIGNIAO and the Coruna telemetry endpoint /api/iptj, each run as ip:104.233.217[.]108 content:"<indicator>".

The pattern is consistent. Injection-stage strings are absent. The two partial matches do not change that. JIUJIU888 appears in ten files only as an account name in records about an unrelated fraud operation, and .icu appears in six files without any of the published router names. This separates the workbench from the injection infrastructure as a matter of content, not inference. A defender chasing the November 16 incident should treat this host as a different stage of the same ecosystem, the development and panel side, not as one of the routers that served the iframes. The two track.js build hashes from public reporting did not match any file in the directory, which is in line with the same split. The payload host itself is a separate record in Etugen, covered below.

Hunting for more

The directory gives several stable patterns. Each was turned into an Etugen search a reader can run, and the new infrastructure was carried out of the files.

Pattern Evidence Etugen query Matches Confidence
Coruna kit file set CorunaParse.php, coruna_*.py ip:104.233.217[.]108 filename:"Coruna" 40 High
DarkSword kit file set DarkSword.php, darksword_router.py, darksword.db ip:104.233.217[.]108 filename:"DarkSword" 14 High
Operator banner iOS V2 管理系统 across backend scripts content:"iOS V2 管理系统" 88 High
Service ad header 搭建 二开 网站维护 on app modules content:"搭建 二开 网站维护" 39 High
DarkSword API surface /api/ds/* beacon, result, war content:"/api/ds/" 12, on 4 hosts Medium

The documents and the router carried out four indicators that the incident's public reporting did not list: we.xpjkk[.]xyz and its resolution 43.247.132[.]175, read from the pentest report; i.131422[.]com, the capture source in the router header; and the operator handle JackApple. The IP address does appear in public reporting on an unrelated topic; the two domains and the handle were not found in public reporting online. Each is a lead for a saved search alert. The directory's files also referenced a cluster of further hosts worth watching rather than treating as confirmed, including k.ycka[.]my, t.ycka[.]my, load.msxf[.]info, io7krjae[.]cfd, strdanalysis[.]bond, 23.251.32[.]29 and 199.68.217[.]220. These were surfaced in the same workspace but not independently profiled, so they are carried into monitoring at low confidence.

The YARA rules from this hunt run in Etugen's YARA scanning over files collected from open directories. They key on the distinctive kit artifacts rather than generic strings. The router rule is short and specific:

rule coruna_darksword_router_py
{
    strings:
        $a = "DarkSword" ascii wide
        $b = "/gooll/" ascii
        $c = "iOS 18 only" ascii wide
        $d = "131422.com" ascii
    condition:
        $a and 2 of ($b, $c, $d)   // router header plus a kit route or the capture source
}

Companion rules match CorunaParse.php on its WALLET_LETTERS map, DarkSword.php on its /api/ds/ surface, the iOS V2 管理系统 operator banner, and coruna_bin.py on the MASTER_KEY album packager.

The payload host, as Etugen recorded it

The injection side did reach Etugen, one day after the incident. On November 17, 2026, between 10:16 and 10:27 UTC, Etugen recorded 136.113.106[.]136, the address public reporting gives for the payload domain 1688360[.]cc. The host sits in AS396982, Google LLC, in the United States, with ports 22, 80, 443, 20201 and 20202 open (port 22 had been on record since May 16, 2026) and an nginx 1.24.0 server on Ubuntu that redirects plain HTTP to www.1688360[.]cc. Etugen's catalog labels it CryptoClipper and DarkSword, severity high, confidence 85.

Its Trashpile holds five distinct files collected from port 443, seven records in all because track.js and go.js were collected under both the root https://1688360[.]cc/ and the bare IP.

File Size SHA-256 Collected, UTC
track.js 29,882 B f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 2026-11-17 10:16
go.js 2,230 B 619d5522e6a7de1f7a985a73f8cb569752edc84153878e20f35bf3d8b12079c6 2026-11-17 10:20
landing.html 12,572 B 749ed9f8c8f0114aa65f4ed786c0513e9b5ffc82e13134b12f73e6ef5a5c6def 2026-11-17 10:22
shell-guard.js 3,398 B 483005a8327e599037c6891fbafa425563c9d906e4fb95395fab47bdd8dfc79a 2026-11-17 10:23
html2canvas.min.js 198,689 B e87e550794322e574a1fda0c1549a3c70dae5a93d9113417a429016838eab8cb 2026-11-17 10:24

Three things stand out. The track.js hash is one of the builds listed in public reporting, so Etugen collected the reported payload from the server itself. The server was still answering on its IP ten hours after public reporting says the domain was suspended at the registry. And three of the file names, go.js, landing.html and shell-guard.js, do not appear in the public indicator lists at all. The two addresses published for the iOS router domains were not found in Etugen.

What the files are

The files were read from Etugen's copies, not from the live server.

File What it is Indicators inside
track.js The payload served to injected sites. 716 lines, not obfuscated, comments in English 1688360[.]cc/hit.php, 1688360[.]cc/card.php, 1688360[.]cc/html2canvas.min.js, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html, eight replacement wallet addresses
landing.html A product landing page styled after a hardware wallet brand, comments in Chinese 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/embed.js?ch=877d0432&k=4d18c0aadaf93bf9, and a reference to /track.js
go.js Sends clicks on a cloned home page to landing.html, comments in Chinese landing.html
shell-guard.js Keeps a cloned page as a static shell: links, forms and off-site requests are neutralised, comments in Chinese attribute data-shell-guard
html2canvas.min.js A copy of a public screenshot library none
Etugen Trashpile view of go.js on 136.113.106[.]136
Figure 4: go.js on 136.113.106[.]136 in Etugen's Trashpile, with its content preview and hashes

The copy of track.js confirms the published picture from Etugen's own data: both router domains, both collection endpoints and the eight wallet addresses are in the file. It also adds to it. The router path /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, the script embed.js with its channel parameter ch=877d0432, and the three files that turn the payload host into a cloned storefront for a wallet brand are not in the public indicator lists. So the same server that fed the injected snippets was also set up as a lure site of its own.

Where the payload meets the kit

This is the link the first half of this post could not make. Two artifacts in the incident's payload are specific to the kit family that Etugen had already indexed.

Artifact in the incident's track.js Where else Etugen has it Etugen query Files
Attribute data-chain-url, set on the boot.js script tag boot.js on 104.233.217[.]108, collected November 1 and 2, which reads that attribute content:"data-chain-url" 5
Stage directory weifile under a channel directory 104.233.217[.]108, where the kit's channel_defaults.json sets it as the stage directory under channel/<name>/, and on 31.58.136[.]212, 14.128.50[.]213 and 14.128.50[.]253 content:"weifile" 27

data-chain-url occurs in five files across all of Etugen: the payload on the incident's host and the router script in the workbench, nothing else. The incident's loader passes its settings to boot.js through the same attributes the workbench's boot.js reads, and it points at a weifile stage under a channel directory named JIUJIU888, the layout the kit's own defaults describe. On that evidence the iOS stage of the incident was built with this kit family, with high confidence.

Who ran it is a separate question. The published router domains and the channel code 02111110 are still absent from the workbench, so the incident was not run from that directory. The channel name is the one lead: jiujiu888 is also the account name recorded in the workbench's files about a fraud operation. A shared handle is a weak tie by itself and is carried here as a lead, not as attribution.

The workbench also holds browser storage that records a further deployment using the same layout, ssrgbkbky[.]com/channel/8.9.4J/weifile/, which was not found in public reporting online.

The same kit on seven more hosts

The workbench is not the only place the two kit names appear. A filename search across all of Etugen returned 36 files named for DarkSword and 63 named for Coruna, on six hosts besides the seed. A seventh host, 31.58.136[.]212, carries no file with either name but holds iOS exploit chain scripts whose content names DarkSword. None of these hosts was found in public reporting online.

Address What the Trashpile holds Open port First seen Verification
31.58.136[.]212 23,909 files, with iOS chain scripts that name DarkSword in their content, such as rce_loader.js and kernel_priv_26.js 8899, 9002 2026-11-02 Etugen Trashpile
14.128.50[.]213 15,015 files, with DarkSword C2 and panel process logs 8089/tcp 2026-10-22 Etugen Trashpile
14.128.50[.]149 22,742 files, with DarkSword C2 and panel process logs 8089/tcp 2026-10-22 Etugen Trashpile
14.128.50[.]253 11,773 files, with DarkSword panel files 8089/tcp 2026-10-22 Etugen Trashpile
47.102.192[.]23 59,291 files, with Coruna analysis notes 9094, 9876, 8888, 19877 2026-06-19 Etugen Trashpile
65.108.218[.]45 804 files, with one DarkSword-named page 7777/tcp 2026-06-20 Etugen Trashpile
172.245.39[.]245 851 files, with Coruna-named enumeration files 9000/tcp 2026-10-15 Etugen Trashpile

The dates matter. The earliest of these files reached Etugen on June 19, 2026, five months before the incident, and the three hosts in 14.128.50[.]0/24, all in CTG Server Limited, were indexed with process logs for a C2 and a panel on October 22. These hosts were profiled from Trashpile metadata and file names; their files were not read in depth, so the role of each is stated from what the names and counts show. As with the seed, none of the published incident indicators was found on any of these seven hosts.

Tactics and techniques

The workbench was mapped against MITRE ATT&CK, yielding ten techniques across six tactics. The ones confirmed firsthand rest on files read in the directory: the kit source itself as capability development, the DarkSword HTTP C2 surface, the credential and wallet collection modules, and the 7z album packager. The campaign-level techniques, supply-chain delivery, drive-by compromise and DGA domain generation, are described by public reporting and the kit's own routing but were not observed as live network activity from this host, so they are marked confirmed: false.

target 104.233.217[.]108period 24 Sep to 2 Nov 2026confirmed 5unconfirmed 5

Resource Development

  • T1587.001Develop Capabilities: Malware Coruna and DarkSword backend source, cloned and rebuilt
  • T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains DGA-style .icu domains per public reporting

Initial Access

  • T1195Supply Chain Compromise web experimentation platform JS delivery, public reporting
  • T1189Drive-by Compromise hidden iframe kit load, kit routes /go /pe /gooll

Execution

  • T1203Exploitation for Client Execution iOS 18 exploit chains, darksword_router.py and DarkSword.php

Credential Access

  • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files darksword_passwords.txt, wallet mnemonic parsing

Collection

  • T1119Automated Collection album and notes collection APIs
  • T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility coruna_bin.py 7z package with MASTER_KEY

Command and Control

  • T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols DarkSword /api/ds/* beacon, result, war
  • T1568.002Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms dga_domains.py and dga-domain.conf present, .icu per reporting

Confirmed from analysisSuspected, not confirmed

Detection and defense

Layer Recommendation
Network Watch for 43.247.132[.]175, we.xpjkk[.]xyz and i.131422[.]com in egress and DNS, and save an Etugen search alert for the two domains
Network Block webshell[.]lol with its subdomains chat.webshell[.]lol and xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol, and 1688360[.]cc
Network Alert on DarkSword C2 shape /api/ds/beacon, /api/ds/result, /api/ds/war and the router routes /go/, /pe/, /gooll/
Network For the injection stage described in public reporting, block the reported .icu routers and the telemetry endpoint /api/iptj, which are separate from this workbench
Endpoint Hunt for files named CorunaParse.php, DarkSword.php, darksword_router.py, coruna_bin.py and the coruna_*.py management scripts
Endpoint Use the iOS V2 管理系统 operator banner and the 搭建 二开 网站维护 service-ad header as content signatures for cloned kit files
Identity Treat any device that loaded a hidden iframe from the reported injectors as a wallet-theft exposure, since the collection modules parse wallet mnemonics and tag wallet sources
General The password list and wallet material in the directory most likely belong to victims rather than the operator; route that collection, under masking, to the affected parties through the appropriate channel
General Load this hunt's YARA rules into Etugen's YARA scanning and save a search alert for the handle JackApple

Takeaways

The first point is that an exposed directory can tell you which stage of a campaign you are looking at. The November 16 reporting mapped the injection side. This host is the back office: the kit parsed, rebuilt from captured traffic, maintained with audit and recovery scripts, and advertised as a buildout service. The content search that found none of the injection-side strings is what draws that line, and it is a line defenders can act on.

The second point is about what the kit is really after. The collection modules do not chase generic data. They parse wallet seed phrases, tag the wallet brand down to a single channel letter, and package photo albums into encrypted archives. A drive-by chain against iPhones and iPads, in this operator's hands, is a crypto-theft pipeline with a curated back office.

The third and final point is provenance. The router header records that the chain was captured from a deployment at i.131422[.]com, and the operator report documents a break-in against a JackApple admin panel at we.xpjkk[.]xyz. One actor is building on another's work and selling the result. Those three addresses never appeared in the incident's public indicators, and they are the thread a defender should pull next.

IOC list (defanged)

New infrastructure surfaced by Etugen from the workbench files:

Type Value
Domain we.xpjkk[.]xyz
IPv4 43.247.132[.]175
Domain i.131422[.]com
Operator handle JackApple
Service ad 搭建 二开 网站维护

Open directory host:

Type Value
IPv4 104.233.217[.]108
Port 8888/tcp
ASN AS54600, PEG TECH INC

Payload host of the incident, as recorded by Etugen:

Type Value
IPv4 136.113.106[.]136
Domain 1688360[.]cc, www.1688360[.]cc
Ports 22, 80, 443, 20201, 20202
File names track.js, go.js, landing.html, shell-guard.js, html2canvas.min.js

Files collected by Etugen from the payload host (SHA-256):

New indicators read from the payload host files and the workbench:

Type Value
URL 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/embed.js?ch=877d0432&k=4d18c0aadaf93bf9
URL eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html
Domain ssrgbkbky[.]com
Strings data-chain-url, data-channel-code, data-landing, data-shell-guard, weifile

Injector domain from public reporting, with the subdomains seen in stealer log records:

Type Value
Domain webshell[.]lol
Domain chat.webshell[.]lol
Domain xiaoshen.webshell[.]lol
URL path /get.js, /guest

Further hosts carrying files named for the kits:

File hashes (SHA-256): reported track.js builds, injection stage per public reporting. The second was collected by Etugen from the payload host; neither was found in the open directory.

Host-based indicators:

Type Value
Operator banner iOS V2 管理系统
Kit files CorunaParse.php, DarkSword.php, darksword_router.py, coruna_bin.py
Router routes /go/{code}, /pe/{filename}, /gooll/{filename}
DarkSword API /api/ds/beacon, /api/ds/result, /api/ds/war
Coruna channel fields /a, /u, /event, /ub, /uj, /us
Collection packager coruna_bin.py, 7z archive with MASTER_KEY password

References


The findings in this post rest on analysis of files found in a publicly exposed directory and on Etugen's scan and Trashpile data. Prior public reporting on the campaign is kept separate from what Etugen observed firsthand. All indicators were valid at the time of writing.